ABSTRACT: Allocating indivisible items between agents in a fair manner is a fundamental problem that has attracted a lot of interests in the last
only two agents with additive utility functions, and give a NP-hardness result for the problem of checking the existence of Nash-product fair allocations. Finally, we consider the problem which determines, given a problem instance, the largest value c for which there exists an allocation in which every agent gets a bundle of goods of utility of at least c times her Nash-product share.
A. Related work
The max-min share was considered for the first time by Budish [9] as a fair criterion for the allocation of courses to students at the Harvard university. Since then, there has been a sequence of papers investigating this criterion 1, 2, 7, 20, 14, 17] . Bouveret and Lemaitre [7] prove that computing max-min shares is NP-hard but leave open the question of whether or not the problem of determining the existence of max-min fair allocations is NP-hard as well. For two agents, it is well-known that there is always a max-min fair allocation which can be found via a simple cut-and-choose protocol. However, this is not the case for any problem instance with more than two agents [17] . Hence, many attempts have focused on finding a small constant value c for which there always exists an allocation such that every agent gets a bundle of utility of at least a fraction c of her max-min share. Procaccia and Wang [17] show that 2 / 3 c and give an (exponential) algorithm for computing an allocation corresponding to this value c . By redesigning parts of the algorithm of Procaccia and Wang [17] , Amanatidis et al. [1] show that a 2 / 3 -max-min fair allocation can be found in polynomial time. For a small number of agents, the problem is understood better. For three agents, it is shown by Amanatidis et al.
It still remains open whether the lower bound of 7 / 8 can be further improved for a higher constant number of agents. Very recently, Aziz et al. [2] have given a polynomial-time approximation scheme for computing an optimal max-min fair allocation, assuming that the number of agents is fixed.
For proportionally fair allocations, the problem of checking the existence of such allocations is NP-complete, even with two identical agents (Bouveret and Lemaitre [7] ). A first lower bound for c , which is essentially a function depending both on the number of agents and on the maximum value of any agent for a single good, is provided by Hill [13] . Markakis and Psomas [16] present a polynomial-time algorithm for constructing an allocation with respect to this lower bound. An improvement of this bound is then proposed by Gourves et al. [11, 12] .
Since we will study the Nash-product share criterion in this paper, we would like to give a brief overview of results on the problem of computing maximum Nash-product allocations. This problem is shown to be NP-hard by Nguyen et al. [19] . In addition, it has been recently proved that there is a constant factor for which one cannot have an approximation algorithm of a factor better than [21] . A first approximation algorithm for the problem with an approximation factor of () Om is given in [18] , where m denotes the number of goods. This result was improved by Cole and Gkatzelis in [6] where the authors obtained an approximation algorithm with a constant factor 2.89. Very recently, Cole et al. [4] have achieved a further improved factor of 2 for the problem. For the special case when all agents have the same utility functions, there is a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for the problem [18] .
II. PROBLEM MODELS
In a fair allocation we are given a finite set 1,. O , (i.e., every item is given to some agent).
We denote by the set of all such allocations .
Given an allocation setting ( , , )
A O U , we want to find an allocation 1 ( ,..., ) n that is fair. There are several common criteria for fairness which have been studied intensively in the literature, including: max-min share, proportional share, min-max share, envy-free, and CEEI. For a detailed description of these fairness criteria, we refer to a recent paper by Bouveret and Lemaitre [7] . In this paper we introduce a new criterion, called Nash-product share, which are formally defined below. We also define the max-min share and proportional share since we will make a comparison between these notions of fairness in the next section.
Definition. Given an allocation setting ( , , )
A O U , define Let us consider the relationship our notions have to one another. Proportional fairness is the strongest among the above fairness notions and implies Nash product fairness, which implies max-min fairness.
Proposition 1. Let ( , , )
A O U be an allocation setting and iA . We have PS NPS MMS i i i , and, furthermore, all these fairness notions are distinct.
Proof. The chain of inequalities follows from the inequalities between arithmetic and geometric. To see that the max-min fairness does not imply the Nash-product fairness, consider two agents with identical utility functions over four items. The items are valued 1, 2, 3, and 5, respectively. The max-min share of both agents is 5 (with allocations {(1,5), (2,3)} and {(5), (1, 2,3)} , whereas NPS 30 5
i . But then no Nash-product fair allocation exists. That the other fairness notions are also distinct is again easy to show using the definitions of arithmetic and geometric.
In this paper we study the following problems.
NPS-Comp

Given:
An allocation setting ( , , ) A O U , an agent i , and a number 0 .
Question: Do we have NPS i ?
NPS-Exist
Given:
An allocation setting ( , , ) A O U .
Question:
Is there a Nash-product fair allocation?
III. HARDNESS RESULT AND APPROXIMATION ALGORITHM
A. Proof. To prove NP-hardness part, we rely on a reduction from the NP-complete problem 3-Dimensional Matching (3DM), which is defined as follows:
3-Dimensional Matching
Given: Three disjoint sets d is the only item assigned to her. Indeed, since there are only /2 q dummy items, there are at most /2 q agents having dummy items in . We call those agents "big" agents, and the other ones "small" agents. If a big agent received a dummy item d and another item t , then by transferring t to any small agent, the Nash product (i.e., the product of agents' utilities) will be improved. The same argument can be applied to show that if an agent received an item from the first q / 2 + 3 largest items in the list, then that is the only one she had in . Hence, there are 3 q worst-off agents in , each receiving an item of value 1. The Nash-product share of every agent is . The proof is complete. ■
B. Approximation Algorithm
The result above implies that the problem of computing a Nash-product fair allocation (if exists one) is also NPhard. This means there is no polynomial-time algorithm for solving this problem, unless P = NP. Alternatively, one can investigate the similar question studied by Nguyen et al. [20] , but for the case of Nash product fair allocation: Given a problem instance, compute an -Nash product fair allocation for the maximum possible value of , that is, an allocation such that every agent i gets a bundle of value of at least .NPS . We consider the following optimization problem:
NPS-Opt
Input:
Output:
Compute an allocation that maximizes () N cI .
Note that NPS-Opt is NP-hard and thus our focus is on designing approximation algorithms which run in polynomial time in the size of the instance and has small constant approximation factor. In what follows, we provide a PTAS which relies on the following recent result by Nguyen et al. [20] . Theorem 3. (Nguyen et al. [20] ). If the number of agents is fixed and for any constant (0,1) , one can compute a set of feasible allocations P such that for any allocation , there is an allocation ' P such that ( ' ) (1 ) ( ) Proof. Let I = (A,O,U) be an allocation setting and a be a fixed constant. We first compute a set P using the algorithm of Nguyen et al. [20] . Furthermore, for each agent i we compute the approximate value (1 )NPS i by using the algorithm of Nguyen et al. [19] . 
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have introduced a new criterion of fairness which we call Nash-product share. This criterion lies between the max-min share and the proportional share in the scale studied by Bouveret and Lemaitre [7] . We have also studied the three problems and obtained several novel results. In fact, we have proved that both the problem of computing the Nash-product share and the problem of checking whether there exists a Nash-product fair allocation for a given allocation setting are NP-hard. In addition, we have presented a polynomial-time approximation scheme for the problem of determining, given an allocation setting i , the largest value of () N cI for which every agent receives a bundle of value of at least a fraction () N cI of her Nash-product share.
